Comment: Uyghur people are too terrorised to join in Covid protests Published on: 2 December 2022 Writing for The Conversation, Jo Smith Finley discusses how the Uyghur people have suffered most from draconian zero-COVID policies but Uyghur-dominant cities remain silent. , The latest wave of protests sweeping through China were sparked by the in a in a high-rise apartment block in 脺r眉mchi, Xinjiang. Residents were apparently prevented from leaving the building due to the enforcement of zero-COVID regulations. The region is home to 12 million ethnic Uyghurs, a minority group in China. Yet, when Uyghur activist Abduweli Ayup about the protests, he noted that there had been no signs of Uyghurs鈥� participation, and Uyghur-dominant cities remained silent. Meanwhile, areas including 脺r眉mchi, Qorla and K眉n盲s counties, dominated by Han Chinese people, who make up around 92% of China鈥檚 population, had erupted in protest at the government鈥檚 zero-COVID policy. The impact of years of systematic strategies of against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims means that those communities have remained in the aftermath of the fire. Meanwhile, Han residents of Xinjiang 鈥� the for the Communist party 鈥� have confidently come out in force to protest against the hated policy. Every Uyghur knows that criticism of party policy by a Turkic Muslim will result in being detained and abused in the state鈥檚 internment camps or prisons or else coerced into forced labour. In the context of street demonstration, they face a . A similar disparity was observed in Lhasa in October, where Tibetans were from the crowds of demonstrators taking to the streets in defiance of zero-COVID restrictions. after the fire, the police reaction to Han protests in Lhasa was lenient. Again, this is a reflection of the way Beijing depends on the Han Chinese population in Tibet to defend its interests. But the glaring discrepancy prompted social media users police would have cracked down more harshly had protesters been Tibetan. The protests following the fire have given Han Chinese citizens a new sense of solidarity with those who died in the 鈥淎uspicious Court鈥� (Jixiangyuan) community in 脺r眉mchi. The shared restrictions amid unjustified levels of zero-COVID surveillance and associated restrictions on their freedom were finally relatable. Both were 鈥溾��. Now, between the fire in 脺r眉mchi and the in which 27 residents died en route to a COVID quarantine facility. They related to the who miscarried when prevented from leaving her compound thanks to zero-COVID. They mourned the who died from carbon monoxide poisoning after his father was prevented from rushing him through an epidemic checkpoint. They identified with the residents in Chengdu who found emergency exits in their buildings sealed during a , the who sat bleeding outside the hospital as she awaited nucleic acid results, and the whose mother jumped from the 12th floor of a building to escape lockdown. As multiple users : 鈥淗istory keeps repeating itself and it鈥檚 the common poor people who pay the price.鈥� Local officials in 脺r眉mchi held a press conference on November 25, denying that zero-COVID protocols had been in place on the night of the fire and for 鈥渓acking the capability to protect and rescue themselves鈥�. The reaction on social media was furious. One : 鈥業 thought they would come to apologise, instead they came to hold [residents] accountable 鈥� It鈥檚 all the people鈥檚 fault.鈥� Strained relationship Yet, until now, how far had the average Han citizen considered themselves to have much in common with the Uyghurs? The answer is very little. This was reflected in the hurt and incomprehension expressed by Uyghur Twitter users in response to the Han reaction. As one : "If [a] Uyghur protests, the Chinese government calls us terrorists, extremists, and separatists, and the Han Chinese netizens believe that.鈥� Another : 鈥淚f you feel pain, it means you are alive. But if you feel other people鈥檚 pain, only then are you a human being.鈥� It was Uyghur, not Han, netizens who of the Uyghur , and of doors bolted shut from the outside. In 2009, a peaceful protest held in the regional capital 脺r眉mchi against the killing of at least two Uyghur migrant workers by Han co-workers at a factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong province, . The Chinese authorities responded by with disproportionate force. As a result there followed a complete between Uyghur and Han residents. Since then, Chinese authorities have increasingly represented Uyghurs to the Han populace as or Islamic 鈥渆xtremists鈥�. It鈥檚 a divide-and-rule strategy that heightened during the 鈥溾�� launched in 2014, and after the implementation of 鈥溾�� regulations in 2017. Yet the inter-ethnic dimension continues to be lost on the international media. Reports have focused on for Presdient Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to step down. This has allowed the party to fall back on its mantra of provocation by 鈥渇oreign hostile forces鈥�, a notion met with suitable by protestors. It is possible that the party will quell the current protests and quietly relax its zero-COVID policy (as it in Urumchi and Qorla). If it does, then the current protests propelled by Han communities may die away, even as state violence against non-Han groups on China鈥檚 peripheries continues. Alternatively, the CCP may conclude it must continue with that fated policy. For, as a Chinese scholar working in the UK (who wishes to remain anonymous for security reasons) pointed out, Xi has staked his political legitimacy upon it. For that scholar, the second option is preferable, since it will ensure that the nationwide protest movement continues to grow. But for that movement to succeed, the very first step must be for Han citizens to , and stand in solidarity, with their persecuted , Tibetan, Inner Mongolian and Hongkonger compatriots. , Reader in Chinese Studies, This article is republished from under a Creative Commons license. Read the . 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